Nothing whole. Nowhere resident. No one trusted.
Every secure radio in service bets that its key stays secret, its link stays open and a box can guard the boundary. Against a peer adversary all three bets are losing. Irythra does not harden the key, the link or the guard. It removes them.
Every COMSEC system in service makes three bets. All three are now losing.
The key stays secret
It is on the device. Encrypt it, wrap it in a TPM, demand a PIN: it is still there. One captured radio, and the response is a net-wide re-key measured in days, run under contact. So units delay reporting the loss.
The link stays open
One primary, one fallback. Jamming forces the fallback, then forces silence. And a link that stays open keeps radiating, with its volume, timing and who-talks-to-whom on display.
A box can guard the boundary
Cross-domain guards cost crores, accredit in years and become the chokepoint at H-hour. So staff officers retype grid references into chat, and that person becomes the real cross-domain solution.
Ukraine settled an old argument. Direction-finding, integrated into fires, turned transmissions into targeting cues. A radio that is perfectly encrypted and perfectly locatable is a beacon that kills its operator.
And units that could not distribute keys fast enough fell back to civilian handsets: a logistics failure, not a cryptographic one. A stronger cipher fixes neither.
One protocol. Four products. Two mission profiles.
Quorum Lace is the protocol every Irythra product speaks. Each layer removes one thing an adversary would otherwise target.
Built for the formations that feel the problem first
Tactical networks
Signals branches, dismounted sections and command posts operating under capture, jamming and direction-finding.
Learn moreUnmanned systems
UAS units that need command without a radiating ground station, self-authenticating swarms and a defensible mission record.
Learn moreCoalition & intelligence
Release cells and partner operations that today choose between withholding a report and retyping one grid into chat.
Learn moreMaritime & border
Navy, Coast Guard and CAPFs on long patrols with intermittent, mixed bearers and a real contested-communications need.
Learn moreTrust that is a property of the architecture, not a clause in a contract
We hold no master key
The identity root and attribute authority are the customer's. We cannot decrypt customer traffic under contract, legal compulsion or acquisition.
One root of trust
Everything but Sigilcore is software. The supply chain to establish is one component, not a radio fleet.
Overlay, not rip-out
Quorum Lace rides the bearers a unit already carries. Adoption does not require replacing a radio fleet.
Status volunteered
What is real, what is a stub and what would prove us wrong are published, not extracted in a meeting.
What we do next, and what would prove us wrong
iDEX is the door; DAP Chapter III is the room. Every phase has a kill criterion we would rather meet in a trial than in service.
Certified crypto core
ML-KEM / ML-DSA through a validated module; formal model of quorum unlock and handshake.
Saelvor on issued COTS
Lab trial against a real EW team.
Signals user trial
iDEX user trial with a signals regiment; UAS profile with a UAS unit.
First order
Accreditation pathway, Release coalition pilot, first Chapter III order.
Engineering notes, stated plainly
The decisive EW lesson was emission, not decryption
Why a perfectly encrypted radio can still be the most dangerous thing a section carries, and what that means for COMSEC design.
Read 10 Nov 2026 · Engineering · 7 minErasure coding is not encryption
How Driftwell keeps an intercepted bearer at zero bits of key, and why Reed–Solomon alone would not.
Read 10 Nov 2026 · Status · 4 minWhat is real, and what is not: November 2026
Our engineering status, volunteered rather than extracted: what works, what is a stub, and what would prove us wrong.
ReadThe binding constraint is a signals regiment willing to run a trial.
Not capital. If you can open that door, or want the architecture note and the runnable prototype to take apart yourself, we would like to hear from you.